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Abstract.  Although equality and solidarity are often thought of as constituent parts of
the same ideological framework, there are inconsistencies between them.  Both
concepts refer to a range of meanings: equality can refer to equal treatment,
opportunity or result, and solidarity, a term which is of growing influence in European
social policy, can refer to mutual aid or group cohesion.  Despite the close association
of these ideas in theory, there is a tension between them, and they  offer prescriptions
for policy which are likely to conflict.  British pensions policy is taken as an illustration;
the case for solidaristic redistribution has had to be balanced against that for
egalitarian policies, with some unpredictable results.  The concepts of equality and
solidarity can be reconciled, but this depends on the application of a set of limiting
interpretations; they can just as easily be represented as incompatible.
The idea of 'fraternity' is one of the great socialist ideals, though it is litle discussed in
comparison with the literature on 'liberty' or 'equality'.  The term was defined after the
French Revolution, in the constitution of year III, in the following terms:
"Do not do to others what you would not want them to do to you; do constantly
to others the good which you would wish to receive from them."  (cited Tulard
et al, 1987, p.832).
Although this is not a very accurate description of the concept - it misses almost
altogether the dimensions of collective action and social bonding which characterise
the concept - it helps to identify what the principle became.  Barker (1951) suggests
that the idea of 'fraternity' probably has more to do with emotion than with any
principle of action; but in so far as it does have a content, it refers to 'co-operation' or
'solidarity' (1951, p.142). In the literature of social policy, 'solidarity' refers to the
establishment of collective action and recognition of mutual responsibility (Spicker,
1990).  This is often related to egalitarian policies, in one way or another.  However, the
prescriptions of 'solidarity' may tend in a very different direction to policies which
pursue equality.   Equality and solidarity are not necessarily incompatible objectives,
but as commonly understood, there is a tension between them which means that each
might undermine the other.  
Equality
Equality refers, in a social context, to the removal of disadvantage.  A number of critics
tend to confuse 'equality' with 'sameness' or uniformity; but people are not considered
'unequal' simply because their hair is a different colour, because some are fat or some
are thin, or even because, like the ant and the grasshopper, some people make music
while others make food.  People are unequal because there is something which leads to
them being advantaged or disadvantaged in terms of treatment, opportunities or
circumstances.  This may be based in differences between people - the classic examples
are race and gender (both, it is important to note, socially constructed issues); but the
objective of policies concerned with equality is not to remove differences, but to
change the relationships which the differences imply.  
Egalitarian policies are commonly framed in three main ways (though there are many
dimensions: Rae, 1981).  Equality of treatment, or procedural equality, is concerned
with the removal of bias or unfairness in the way people are responded to; this includes
measures against discrimination and equality before the law, and in the context of
social policy, it is primarily linked to access to services.  Equality of opportunity might
be taken to mean that everyone has an equal opportunity to compete (in which case it
is not necessarily distinguished from equality of treatment), but it may also be taken to
mean that people are able to compete on equal terms, which implies a removal of
substantive disadvantages in the means to compete.  Equality of result, or substantive
equality, is concerned with the distribution of rewards and privileges.  (I have discussed
these issues at some length elsewhere: Spicker, 1985; 1988).
Equality is frequently, and not surprisingly, linked with the issue of redistribution. 
'Redistribution' covers generally those circumstances in which the resources of some
are transferred to others, or used to benefit others.  This might, of course, include
regressive as well as progressive measures, and not all redistribution is egalitarian in its
intention or its effects; but redistribution is seen as one of the principal means through
which greater equality can be achieved.  Equality of treatment implies redistribution
only in the most limited terms, in so far as the power and advantages of some are
limited in order to protect the position of others who are disadvantaged.  Equality of
opportunity, taken to mean the provision of an equal foundation for competition,
implies rather more progressive redistribution; it is necessary to provide at least a base
level of goods, services and resources in order to realise opportunities.  Equality of
result, of necessity, requires a major progressive redistribution of resources and
powers.  Although these positions represent arguments which are qualitatively
different, they can also be seen as progressively increasing stages in the demand for
egalitarian redistribution.
Rae (1981, ch 6) outlines four strategies for the reduction of disadvantage.  The first is
maximin, which is to maximise the minimum standard experienced.  This reduces
inequality in so far as the disadvantage of those who are poorest is reduced, though it
does not necessarily imply that that redistribution is progressive above the minimum
level.   Second, it is possible to change the ratio of inequality, which means that the
resources of those who are worse off are improved relative to those who are better off. 
Third, there is the reduction in the range of inequality, by reducing the distance
between those who are worst off and those who are best off, which Rae refers to as
'least difference'.  (This may seem similar to the ratio principle, but it is possible to
reduce the ratio while increasing the distance, for example by paying greater  amounts
to people who are better off, which is one of the the effects of earnings-related
pensions.)   Lastly, there is 'minimax', or reducing the maximum; there is no absolute
benefit to those who are poorest, but there may be a relative benefit because of
changes in the structure of power and in competition for scarce resources.  It is
possible to defend any of these principles in terms of equality of opportunity; and each
of these four strategies, taken to its extreme, could lead to a similarly equal results. 
But not all of them have the same effects on the people who are initially disadvantaged
during the process of implementation.  Only maximin requires a concentration on the
resources of the worst off.  Minimax leaves them with the same resources, which will
improve their position in relative but not in absolute terms.  A concentration on the
ratio or the least difference may allow for some improvement in absolute resources,
but a reduction in inequality can be achieved with fewer resources being directed to
those with least than would be the case with a maximin strategy.  
The issue is not, then, simply one in which there are progressively increasing demands
for egalitarian redistribution.  What happens, instead, is that different understandings
of the aims and methods of egalitarianism lead to important differences in policy,
method and results.  
Solidarity
The idea of 'solidarity', in its broad sense, is familiar as part of the literature of
sociology, where it is used by Durkheim (1973) to refer to the ways in which people
relate to each other in different divisions of labour, and so to the processes which bind
society together.  In the context of social policy, it refers primarily to a network of social
relationships through which people support each other; and the term has come,
through general use, to have a specific set of meanings in relation to welfare systems. 
In France, the term 'solidaritL' is an established part of the language of social welfare
provision: the concept has been included in the first article of the code of social
security, and the Minister principally responsible for welfare provision is entitled
'ministre des Affaires sociales et de la Solidarité nationale' (Alfarandi 1989 p.181).
The use of the term has been widespread, and it has come to carry a range of
associated meanings, rather than one unambiguous usage.  On one hand, it refers to
the establishment of relationships of mutual support between people, often through
the mechanism of social insurance.  Dupeyroux refers to 'la mutualité' as expressing
solidarity within classes - 'exprimant une solidarité de classe' (1989, p.44).  The
emphasis falls in such cases on mutual aid for social protection, and joint action to
achieve collective ends.  But the idea of 'solidarity' is also used to imply progressive
redistribution.  The Fonds National de Solidarit, which in France is more or less
equivalent to the exchequer contribution to the National Insurance fund for pensions,
is solidaristic because it goes beyond the mechanisms of individual contribution and
entitlement - though it is perhaps worth noting that the state contribution is minimal,
much of the finance coming in practice from creaming off contributions (Spitaels et al,
1971, p 300; Alfarandi, 1989, pp 450-451).  In practice, the idea of solidarity is most
used for benefits which help the poor from general taxation, like the Allocation de
solidarité spécifique for long-term unemployed people.  This seems to identify the idea
of 'solidarity' broadly with the mechanisms of social protection associated with welfare
states.  
The core of the idea of solidarity is the development and acceptance of responsibility
for others.  The nature of that responsibility depends strongly on an interpretation of
the way in which people in society relate to each other.  If people are seen primarily as
individuals who interact with each other on certain terms, then the recognition of
mutual responsibility can be interpreted in terms of 'mutualism', or mechanisms which
depend mutual self-interest - the kind of relationships examined in Olson's book The
logic of collective action (1971).  The capacity of individuals to act can be increased by
co-operation with others; co-operation in the field of welfare helps individuals to
achieve their goals by offering social protection through pooling resources and sharing
risks.  Examples include not only the formal mechanisms of social insurance, but a
range of protective services provided through a welfare state; basic provisions for
health care or income support can be easily justified on a contractarian basis.  
If, by contrast, the view of society which is adopted is collective, the kinds of
responsibility which people have to each other have to be understood not in terms of
individual self-interest but rather of social cohesion or bonding, which is much closer to
the sense in which Durkheim uses the idea of solidarity.  Solidarity as a form of social
cohesion can be seen as having a wider application than it does to welfare provision
alone; norms, patterns of exchange, and social roles might all be seen as different
means through which relationships of mutual responsibility are formed.  This is
solidarity as 'fraternity' rather than 'mutualism'.  
All forms of collective provision can be seen as 'solidaristic' in the broad sense of the
term, if only because collective action requires a degree of solidarity to be possible; but
welfare provision is often represented as particularly important for social cohesion. 
From the point of view of the providers, the provision of welfare represents a practical
expression of social responsibility; for recipients, welfare provision has an important
integrative function (see Boulding, 1967; Titmuss, 1974).  Equally, group cohesion is
strongly associated with collective action.  This view is reflected, for example, in a
report to the Swedish Labour Party:
"in a society which claims solidarity as a basic principle, is demanded organised
co-operation and strengthened influence of society in order that a
redistribution of the unevenly distributed resources and opportunities can
occur"  (cited Kvist, Agren, 1979, p 34).
The influence of the Swedish model can be seen in Furniss and Tilton's work (1979). 
The development of solidaristic action into issues of participation and political
organisation, which Furniss and Tilton advocate as part of a fully developed welfare
state, is simply an extension of the principle of 'fraternity' in the context of welfare.  
It is debatable whether the idea of  solidarity relates directly to the  circumstances  of 
people  who  are disadvantaged,  because  of their limited ability to participate, but it is
widely interpreted as if it  did  so,  and  the  implications  of  the  principle  of solidarity 
for those who are most disadvantaged  are no less complex than those of different
forms of egalitarianism. Solidarity as mutualism tends to refer to situations in which
people might experience low income - like unemployment,  sickness, disability and old
age - but  it does  not  necessarily  relate  to  all  such  circumstances,  and  the
Implications of  any redistribution  would depend  strongly on the nature  of  the  group 
within  which  solidaristic relationships  were held to exist. The social protection which
solidarity provides can be  used  to reinforce the position of  relatively privileged
groups, like professional associations, and it does not necessarily extend to others who
are excluded; indeed, much of the disillusion with the concept   in    France   relates   to  
 the   failure   of    solidaristic arrangements to protect  those who  are most vulnerable. 
(Mossé, 1985; Alfarandi, 1989).  
Solidarity    as    fraternity    is    sometimes    identified   with redistribution to those
who are poorest. This is perhaps implicit in the  identification  of  solidarity  with 
patterns  of  social  security which  are  not  related  to  the  mechanisms  of 
contribution  and entitlement;  in  some  cases,  though,  the  identification  is  quite 
explicit.  Dorion  and  Guionnet  write  of  the  caisses  d'allocations familiales  in  France 
that  they  are  not  there  just  to  provide 'horizontal  solidarity'  - between  people 
without  children  and those  with  them:  their  role  'is  also  to  go  beyond ...
horizontal solidarity  and  to  look  to  improve  the  situation  of  the  most
 disadvantaged families. A vertical solidarity is then superimposed  on the horizontal 
solidarity’. (Dorion, Guionnet, 1983, p 104)  A     similarly    strong    identification     of    
solidarity    with redistribution is implied by the ‘solidaristic wage policy’ pursued by 
the trades union movement  in  Sweden. The objectives of  the policy  are expressly
egalitarian in  form: it  is intended to pursue united   action   for   an   improvement   of  
living  and   working conditions, the  limitation  of  differentials,  and  a level of  income
transfer. (Robinson, 1974) 
However, it is not clear from this that the kind of redistribution demanded by  solidarity
is of  the same kind as that demanded by the different strategies of  equality. The kinds
of  solidarity which are being demanded here are seen as ‘solidaristic’ because people 
stand together:  this can be achieved through egalitarian policies, but it might also be
achieved by other means. Solidarity might be taken to imply the recognition of mutual
interdependence, which would  argue for a limited  income  transfer but  which might 
still fall short of  egalitarianism.  It might  imply social protection:  but social protection 
can  mean  the protection  of  people in  unequal circumstances,  as it does in the case
of earnings-related pensions - which prompted Titmuss’s fear of  ‘two nations in old
age’. It might favour horizontal redistribution - that is, from people in some  categories 
to  people  in  others,  including  for  example redistribution   between   generations,  
or   from   those   without families to those with  families.  Horizontal  redistribution can
be regressive in effect (as it  generally is in cases of  redistribution to older families; and
Le Grand argues that in  general the effect of universal  provision  in  the  welfare  state 
has  been  to  favour the middle  classes: Le Grand, 1982) .   The  patterns  of 
redistribution  identified  as solidaristic   are   different,   then,   from   those   implied  
within egalitarian redistribution. 
Equality and solidarity
Theoretical examinations have identified the concepts of equality and   solidarity  
closely.   Titmuss’s   model   of    ‘institutional- redistributive’  welfare presents  them 
as part  of  an ideal form of welfare,   associated   with   the   idea   of   the   ‘welfare  
state’. (Titmuss, 1974) Institutional welfare is based  on the view  that  needs are
socially constructed, and that conditions of dependency are a normal part of   each  
person’s   life.   Provision   for   need   is,   as   a   result, ‘institutionalized’  in  society. 
This  is  close  to  the  principle  of solidarity; both constitute a set of arguments for
social protection on a collective basis. Titmuss saw this principle as egalitarian - the
‘redistributive’ element of his model - because it meant that social protection would be
offered to everyone, and effectively the losers in  society would be  compensated  by 
the gainers. Institutional welfare is egalitarian, too, in another sense; it has been 
informed  by  a  strategy  which  has  emphasized  not  simple redistribution from rich
to poor, but the use of social provision as a means of  reducing disadvantage in society
as a whole. Tawney argued  that  the object of  egalitarianism 
... is not the division of the nation’s income into eleven million fragments, to be
distributed, without further ado, like a cake  at  a school treat, among its eleven
million  families.  It  is, on the  contrary, the  pooling of its surplus resources by
means of taxation, and the use of the funds thus obtained to make accessible to
all, irrespective of their income, occupation or social position, the conditions of
civilisation which,  in the  absence of such measures, can only be enjoyed by the
rich.  (Tawney, 1931, p 122) 
This   kind    of    position   lends   some   support   to   Mishra’s representation of the
institutional model as an intermediate stage on  the  road  to  socialism, (Mishra, 1981) 
and  if  the  institutional  model can be represented  as  a  means  of  achieving  greater 
social  equality  - even  though  its  practical  effectiveness  in  doing  so  has  been
disputed (see Le Grand, 1982) - it seems to follow that solidarity can be taken in the
same way. However,  despite  the  apparent compatibility  of  the  concepts, there have
to be some reservations. The relationship of  solidarity and equality  is a complex one. 
The initial position from which a discussion  of  the  relationship  between  the  two 
concepts  has  to  begin  is not  that  they  are compatible  or incompatible,  but  only
that they are independent of each other; they refer to a different, if  interrelated,  set
of  issues, and offer different prescriptions for policy. 
The first, and most evident,  tension  stems from the nature of the  groups  to  which 
the  different  concepts  refer.  Solidarity  as mutual  support  implies  that  people 
support  others  who  are supporting  them   - and  those  who  have  not  been  able  to 
contribute, like foreigners, long-term unemployed, or chronically sick  and  disabled 
people,  will  either  not  be  included  or  be included only on inferior terms to others
who do contribute. This could  be  represented  as treatment of  people on the  same
terms, with  the  pretence  that  people would  not  have  been  excluded  if they  had 
only  met  the  requirements,  but  the  conditions  are manifestly not equivalent. The
mechanism is seen most clearly in the  bifurcation  between  insurance-based  benefit 
systems  and means-tested systems; if insurance tends to be relatively generous in 
relation  to  means-testing,  it  is  not  least  because  the  means-tested  programmes 
are  directed  at  those  who  fail  to  meet  the contribution  conditions  of   the 
insurance-based  programmes. Solidarity as fraternity could be extended to take in
many of those excluded on a mutualist basis. Even then, however, one has to ask to  
whom    the   principle    of    fraternity   extends.    Ideas   of ‘community’, ‘fraternity’
and  even  ‘citizenship’ are necessarily exclusive as well as inclusive; there are those
who are defined as falling  outside  the  boundaries  as  well  as  those  within.  Where 
welfare systems have developed on  a specifically industrial basis (as  in  the  régimes 
speciaux  in  France)  they  tend  to  become,  not symbols of universal brotherhood,
but clubs - distinguished not only   by   internal   bonding   but   also  external   barriers.  
The formation  of  exclusive groups,  or even  of  groups with  a  strong local solidarity,
might be seen as being inconsistent with equality in most  senses. 
The second principal  tension concerns the prescriptions which the  different  concepts 
offer  for  redistribution.  Solidarity  and equality are at their most compatible in cases
where both call for progressive redistribution.  Dupeyroux  suggests that  the  idea  of 
solidarity  might  justify  progressive  contributions  in  insurance schemes (Dupeyroux,.
1989, p 147), but the mechanisms often go beyond this; the French régime  de 
solidarité;  for example, is  intended  to protect  those who have  been  unable  to 
contribute.  Progressive  redistribution  to those who  are poor  or disadvantaged 
seems to  be  substantively egalitarian,  at least in the sense that  people finish in a
situation which is more ‘equal’ as a result of the redistribution.  However, the
redistribution which results from solidarity may fall far short of  equality,  for the  kinds 
of  reason  which  have  been  discussed above.  For  solidarity  and  egalitarianism  to 
be  reconciled,  the solidarity  has  to  be  of  a  kind  which  leads  to  a  substantial
progressive redistribution of  resources.  In other words,  it has to be egalitarianism
under a different name. 
In   many   political   debates,   the   issues   of   solidarity   and egalitarianism are often
confused: for example, the case for Child Benefit  is often made  in terms  of  its effects
on poverty When most  of  the  poorest  families  receive  no  net  benefits  from  it; 
objections to student loan schemes, or any other alternative to the highly  regressive 
grant  system,  are  presented  as  a  defence  of disadvantaged students. The character
of these arguments largely reflects  a  common  political  tradition,  which  has  led  to  a 
close ideological identification. But in practice, the two principles have different
implications for policy, and if there are tensions between them  it is not  least that they
have the potential  to pull decision-makers  in different directions.  An  emphasis on
greater equality can  be  taken  to  reduce  the  scope  for  mutualism  - not  least
because   mutualism   has   been   closely   associated   with   the independent  sector. 
And  a  stress on  solidarity as fraternity  can lead to policies which, if  not inegalitarian 
in a strong sense, may fail to redress inequalities  (like universal  provision in education
and health);  may  reflect  existing  inequalities,  like  earnings-related  benefits;  and 
may  even  imply distinctions  and  divisions between  in-groups  and  out-groups,  like
differential  benefits for unemployed  people or discrimination  on the basis of 
nationality or citizenship. 
Equality versus solidarity
The analysis given of the concepts earlier suggests that there is not only one kind of
equality, or one kind of solidarity, but several logically separable principles which stand
in a variety of relations to each other.  This means, unsurprisingly, that there are likely
to be contradictions betwen the various dimensions and formulations of the concepts. 
Conflicts between equality and solidarity might be resolved in several ways.  One
option is to emphasise one value or the other as being of particular significance, so that
equality is desirable in so far as it promotes solidarity or conversely that solidarity is
desirable in so far as it promotes equality.  It is possible to argue, for example, that
greater equality leads to greater solidarity, on the grounds that inequality tends to be
divisive.  In this case the justification for equality is framed partly in terms of solidarity;
equality is, at least in part, a means to an end.  This suggests that egalitarian policies
which undermined social cohesion would be suspect; Crosland's idiosyncratic defence,
in his discussion of equality, of the London clubs and the Guards is consistent with this
principle, as would be a defence of the monarchy (Crosland, 1956, p.217).  It is possible
for conservatives to defend the role of the voluntary sector and charity in similar terms;
if the 'gift relationship' is solidaristic, then the assumption of this role by the state in
the name of equality might tend to undermine solidarity.    
Conversely, one might argue that solidarity is justified in so far as it leads to greater
equality, because solidarity implies sharing and redistribution.  It may happen that
solidaristic policies have an inegalitarian impact, because solidarity can also reinforce
people's position within the social hierarchy.  Examples are student grants, which
generally favour a richer section of the population, and subsidies to owner-occupiers. 
Student grants might be defended in terms of equal treatment or of equality of
opportunity; subsidies to owner-occupiers are difficult to defend on any terms.  But it is
not necessary for an egalitarian to oppose the subsidies directly, because greater
equality can also be achieved through the development of subsidies for other kinds of
household.   
One has the option to accept the value of both solidarity and equality, rejecting the
aspects of each which come into conflict with the other and fostering those aspets
which are complementary.  This implies rejection of solidarity which is inegalitarian (like
the formidable social cohesion of a caste system) or egalitarian policies which are not
solidaristic (like the attempts of French or Soviet revolutionaries to overthrow
traditions).  This seems attractive, but it does surprisingly little to limit the scope for
conflict.  Because both equality and solidarity are complex ideas, they cover a range of
different kinds of policy.  Equality and solidarity can be made compatible, but much
depends on the sense in which the terms are taken; it may mean that equality of
treatment might lead to greater mutual dependence, but it could equally mean that
equality of results leads to a stronger sense of fraternity - two statements of a very
different kind, drawing on different kinds of principle and referring to different values.  
Solidaristic policies may be mutual or fraternal, that is individual or collective; equality
may refer to equality of treatment, opportunity or result.  Because the ideas are
complex, there is the potential for a great deal of ambiguity, and there is often a
certain vagueness about the precise import of particular ideas.  I have tried to show this
in tabular form; although the shortened comments required in a table may seem
cryptic, it is possible in this format to show the extent to which one is dealing with a
matrix of inter-related ideas, rather than a simple relationship between two monolithic
concepts.
Equality leads to solidarity if
Solidarity means:
Mutuality Fraternity
Equality means:
Equal treatment People are able People are seen
to contribute as citizens
and receive on
equal terms
Equal opportunity Gainers Class barriers 
compensate break down
losers
Equal result Benefits and There is social 
services are justice
universal
Solidarity leads to greater equality if
Solidarity means:
Mutuality Fraternity
Equality means:
Equal treatment People join People co-operate 
mutual societies and give each other 
on equal terms common respect
Equal opportunity People are People accept 
protected by a social
solidaristic responsibility
benefits for others 
 (especially
children)
Equal result Shared risks Solidarity results in
lead to progressive 
redistribution redistribution
according to need
Equality can undermine solidarity if
Solidarity means:
Mutuality Fraternity
Equality means:
Equal treatment Distinctions Solidarity was
between in and based in 
out groups are structured
barred differences
Equal opportunity People cannot Competition
co-operate for undermines
mutual advantage co-operation
Equal result People lose There is no
personal 'gift
responsibility relationship'
for mutual aid
Solidarity can undermine equality if
Solidarity means:
Mutuality Fraternity
Equality means:
Equal treatment Solidarity Solidarity
implies a is exclusive
preference for
some over others
Equal opportunity Solidarity People finish
preserves very unequally
advantages
Equal result Limited The principle
solidarities of cohesion 
differentiate preserves
groups structured
differentials
What these tables show is that solidarity and equality can be reconciled, and without
too much difficulty; but also that this depends on a particular set of interpretations of
both concepts.  It is quite possible to interpret the concepts, with equal force, in terms
which are incompatible.  The principles are both complex and independent from each
other; as such they offer different prescriptions for policy which are as capable of
contradicting as they are of reinforcing each other.
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